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1. Introduction* 
Interfirm credit is a neglected theme in theoretical and empirical studies on the heterogeneity of 
financial systems among EMU countries and the regional implications for the transmission 
mechanism of a single monetary policy (see for instance Schmidt, 1999), though an investigation 
into the subject is warranted for at least two reasons. First, widely different national practices and 
legislations disrupt the EU single market objective, thus hindering the development of financial 
techniques, such as asset-backed securitization, and obstructing the standardization of criteria for 
assessing firms' creditworthiness, because of the different incidence of trade credit (TC) and trade 
debt (TD) on their books
1. A stylised fact is that the TD to total assets ratio is larger in 
Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) compared to Northern countries (Germany, 
Scandinavia); there is also evidence, for the past decade, in France (Dietsch-Kemp, 1998; Dietsch, 
1998) and Italy  (Marotta, 1997), of a net TC structural reallocation from smaller to larger firms, 
with a strengthening of the financial dependence of the former from banks. Second, the 
comparability across the EU of effective prices, though the nominal ones are denominated in a 
common currency, is undermined if discounts for quicker payments are neglected
2.  
Institutional innovations, such as the legislations introduced in Italy
3 and the U.K.
4 or the 
recently passed EC Directive on late payments
5, are however bound to modify key aspects of TD, 
raising its relative cost compared to short term loans, especially for larger firms. A likely 
development, at least in the Mediterranean countries, is thus a larger incidence of big borrowers in 
bank lending and a growing reliance on short-term financing instruments such as commercial paper, 
with a pattern of relationships between banks and firms and within firms more similar to what is 
thought to be standard in the literature based on the US experience. Indeed, the common theme 
underlying the theoretical discussion of credit rationing in Jaffee-Stiglitz (1990) and the justification 
for adopting a high TD to liabilities ratio as an indicator to identify empirically credit rationed firms 
                                                 
* This paper is produced as a part of a MURST financially supported research program on Heterogeneity in bank and 
commercial credit markets and distributive effects of monetary shocks. A previous version of the paper was circulated 
with the title: Trade credit in Italy: evidence from individual firms data. I  thank Alberto Zazzaro and participants in a 
seminar at the Bank of Italy for helpful comments. 
1 TC can be treated as if  interfirm credit, provided the share of sales to final consumers (households or public sector) is 
sufficiently small. This assumption is roughly acceptable if firms, as in this study, belong to the manufacturing sector 
(see also fn 25, Table 9 and Appendix 2). 
2 Blinder et al. (1998) report that price stickiness, according to the managers interviewed, is de facto accompanied by 
changes in non price contractual terms, including terms of payment. The finding is not however robust: according to the 
survey in Ng et al. (1999, Table III) there is little willingness among firms to vary TC terms in lieu of product price 
changes.     
3 The bill was approved on June 16
th, 1998. 
4 Late payment of commercial debts (interest) Act 1998. 
5 EC Official Journal dated 8/8/2000, L.200/35. EU countries have to comply, modifying their national legislations, 
within two years from the publication of the Directive.    3 
in Petersen-Rajan (1994) is that larger firms, exploiting their superior credit standing with banks 
and financial markets, may act as intermediaries granting longer payment delays when smaller firms 
are credit squeezed during a  monetary restriction. A key policy implication, as inferred in Kashyap 
et al. (1993), is that because of this Meltzer (1960) effect the credit channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism is weakened; empirical evidence, using data on TC, is however 
inconclusive: Marotta (1997), on an averaged panel of Italian manufacturing firms, does not find 
evidence of a Meltzer effect, whereas an opposite result is claimed in Kohler et al. (2000), on a 
large panel of U.K. quoted firms.  
New legislation on TC in Italy – a country whose economic and financial structure is an almost 
ideal environment for the credit view approach, compared to U.K. (Kashyap-Stein, 1997; Cecchetti, 
1999) – provides a first justification for research on its likely effects on bank-firm and interfirm 
credit patterns; a second justification can be found in the attempt at exploring the distributive 
implications of a single monetary policy in countries with different TC patterns. Because of data 
availability – a rather binding constraint in this area - this study focuses on Italy; the lessons drawn 
from it can however, I would contend, be extended to other Mediterranean countries, because of the 
similarities at least in the relevance of TD compared to bank loans among firms’ liabilities. 
A prerequisite for an evaluation of the effects of a new legislation is an enquiry into some current 
TC key features: contractual and ex post payment delays, ex-ante monetary costs, because of 
discounts for quicker payments and of penalties for late payments. This information has some 
bearing  also on the literature on TC because, though it may be surprising, there is only very 
scattered evidence on these crucial aspects, with the recent partial exceptions of Ng et al. (1999) 
and Wilner (2000) for the U.S.  
These are the grounds for justifying why a first contribution of the paper is to provide a 
descriptive analysis on the TC contractual clauses for the Italian manufacturing sector, exploiting 
the Mediocredito Centrale  (MC) dataset. The 1994 edition of the triennial MC survey on more than 
5000 manufacturing firms – a representative sample for the ones with 11 to 500 employees and all 
larger ones – includes, besides a short time series of annual accounts and information on a set of 
firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics, a questionnaire on TC and TD: credit and debt periods, average 
ex-post delays, percent of TD paid late, size of discounts taken and offered for quicker payments, 
penalties for late payments, how common are these pricing practices. The sample size, even after 
the shrinking to a maximum of 1549 firms, because of missing values and accounting data 
inconsistencies,  is comparable with other cross-section studies. 
The main result is that there is no evidence of a significant cost difference between TD and bank 
loans, basically because of long credit periods and of relatively rare discount offers and even less   4 
widespread penalties applied for late payments. An important implication of this finding is that the 
link between high TD and credit rationing, taken for granted on a priori grounds in recent studies 
for the US and the German experiences (Petersen-Rajan, 1994, Harnhoff-Körting 1998) is, if it ever 
exists, very weak.  
A second contribution of the paper is a cross-section study on the determinants of credit and debt 
periods, integrating accounting data with firms’ answers to a questionnaire on TC. A novel aspect in 
the econometric exercise is the inclusion, among the explanatory variables, of the reported discount 
offers for quick payments. The survey findings are also exploited to suitably split the sample – by 
size, by financial expertise – in order to assess possibly different elasticities to financial 
determinants. The main result is that larger/more financially expert firms do react more strongly to 
financial determinants, thus suggesting that the new European legislations on TC could impact 
differently across firms and countries, given the high heterogeneity in their current practices. The 
similarities of the Italian experience with other Mediterranean countries in interfirm credit hint at 
sizable reallocation effects among TC, bank loans and short-term market financing instruments.  
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparison on TC features in the main 
EU countries and reports the main aspects of the new legislations in Italy and the U.K. and of the 
EC Directive. Section 3 (and the Appendices), after an illustration of the MC database  and of some 
of its shortcomings, offers a rather detailed descriptive analysis of interfirm credit features, 
including the possible links with credit rationing. Section 4 provides a cross-section econometric 
analysis on credit and debt periods, with a special focus on heterogeneous responses to financial 
determinants, including the reported discount offers, of firms differentiated by financial expertise 
and size, and offers some tentative policy implications. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Trade credit in the EU 
2.1 International comparisons 
In Europe, though on scattered data for contractual and effective credit periods, the differences 
across countries are wide, as often remarked by the European Commission, who tried to promote, 
during the early 90’s, a greater harmonization, at first through the softer instrument of a 
recommendation to the States and later through a Directive. Overall, the anedoctal evidence at mid 
90’s showed that Italy was the EU country with longer - from one third to two thirds - effective 
credit periods and average delays beyond agreed dates; Germany was the symmetric case  (Table 1). 
The information does not basically differ from what reported for 1999 by a primary operator 
(Dun&Bradstreet, 2000) on contractual credit periods and on effective delays for trade financing 
among its customers, mostly medium-sized and larger firms.   5 
A comparison, based on averaged data from a representative sample of the manufacturing sector 
in the harmonised accounts data base BACH (Bardes, 2000), shows a stable ranking for the ratios to 
total assets of TC and TD  in the period 1989-1997, with Italy on top (in the last year, respectively 
35 and 25 per cent), followed by Spain (27 and 23 per cent) and France (25 and 20 per cent), while 
Germany’s indicators are significantly lower (10 and 7 per cent)
6. A divergent trend for the two 
ratios shows up however during the period: the first one falls everywhere, most especially in France 
and in Germany; the second one rises in Italy and in Spain and falls in the other two countries. On 
1998 data for France, the average credit period
7 goes from 76 days for medium-sized/small firms to 
72 for larger ones  to 71 for smaller ones; the debt period
8 goes from around 74 for smaller and 
medium-sized/small firms to 71 for the larger ones. For Spain, the 1995 median values for the credit 
and debt periods are 92 and 100 days (Hernandéz de Cos-Hernando, 1998). 
A study comparing French and German manufacturing firms on 1995 firm-level data (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1999) finds, besides the almost triple average debt period in France with respect to 
Germany, that the TD to total assets ratio is about two times for French firms compared to German 
ones (23.4 and 12 per cent, respectively, on median data), whereas the TC ratio to total assets 
differs by more than 10 percentage points (33 and 21 per cent); a striking difference is the short 
term loans to TD ratio, equal to 4 and 62 per cent, respectively. Another interesting aspect, splitting 
the sample into five classes by size, is that the ratio to total assets of net TC goes from around 9-10 
percentage points for French firms up to 2000 employees to a tiny 2.4 per cent for the largest ones; 
the same indicator, in the German case, from around 8-9 percentage points shrinks only slightly to 
6.7 per cent. These statistics suggest a much larger role as net lenders in the interfirm credit market 
for the largest German firms compared to the French ones, a finding empirically supported for the 
last country by the evidence on the exploitation of their market power in interfirm credit with 
smaller counterparties (Dietsch-Kemp, 1998; Dietsch, 1998). A similar pattern during the 80’s and 
early 90’s was detected for Italy in Marotta (1997). 
Searching for an explanation of the differences between the German case, similar to the US one, 
and  the experience of the Mediterranean countries (and of the UK as well
9) a plausible answer is 
that a high/low TD own cost, compared to the immediate substitute, namely short term bank loans, 
depends on both the monetary component – implied interest rates in two-part contracts allowing for 
                                                 
6 German data are even slightly lower than US ones. Of course, the usual caveat on international comparisons of 
accounts data applies. In Germany, for instance, trade credit and debt are net of the items vis-à-vis other firms in the 
same group. 
7 Days of credit = [end of year trade credit/sales]*360 days.
 
8 Days of debt = [end of year trade debt/purchases]*360 days. 
9 Data on UK manufacturing firms referring to early nineties show that on average less than 50% of invoices were paid 
in time; small firms, in the manufacturing and in the services sectors, suffer disproportionately from payment delays 
(Bank of England, 2000).   6 
discounts in case of quicker payments
10 and penalties for ex post  delays  – and the efficiency of 
institutional arrangements in protecting creditors’ claims in case of late payments
11. Even a tentative 
check on how well this answer squares with the facts, borrowing from other national experiences, is 
however hindered because the literature does not provide comprehensive information on the 
monetary TD own cost. In the U.S., recent papers (Ng et al., 1999; Wilner, 2000) show how, even if 
TD is more expensive with respect to short term loans, the actual cost spread cannot be easily 
computed, because it depends on how common is the two-part contract
12: according to the first 
study it is offered by only a quarter of firms, manufacturing and not. An additional component, not 
even considered in these studies, is the size of, and how widespread are, penalties for late payments. 
Among the largest EU countries, only in Germany a 2 per cent discount is usually granted for 
payments within 15 days, even though with sizable differences across sectors (Harhoff-Körting, 
1998); in France this contractual clause is far less widespread. The non-monetary cost component is 
very important as well, because “French payment patterns are not shaped by reservation-of-
ownership rules designed specially to safeguard the interest of creditors […]. The German legal 
system strongly encourages the settlements of trade creditors. The far-reaching legal claim, in the 
form of the extended or expanded reservation of ownership, also assures the seller who has agreed 
such a clause with the purchaser the right of access to the processed product and a claim to the 
proceeds of a later resale and expands the reservation of ownership to claims on the corporate group 
as a whole or on existing current account debtors” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999, p. 36).  
These remarks on the French legal and contractual framework for TC apply very closely to the 
Italian case as well and justify the claim that the results drawn from the MC database have a bearing 
on other EU Mediterranean countries.  
2.2 Institutional innovations in the EU 
The common feature of the legislations introduced in 1998 in Italy and the U.K. are a default 
penalty rate for late payments and normal credit periods much shorter than the current ones.  
In the Italian case, contracts between private parties should by default be written and payments 
scheduled within 60 days (within 90 days in case of regional or national agreements)
13. Late 
payments imply automatically a penalty interest rate on the principal owed of at least 500 basis 
                                                 
10 A two-part contract, d/D, n/N, offers the choice of a per cent discount d if the payment is done within D days, or of a 
net period, n, with a full payment N days after the invoice date, with N usually two to three times D. The implied annual 
opportunity cost, should the buyer decide to forgo the discount in exchange for N-D additional days of financing can be 
computed as  () []
( ) . d /
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−  
11 This is of course a partial possible explanation, because it does not take into account the TC sales promoting role, 
with effective prices being different from nominal ones merely because of delayed payments beyond contractual dates.   
12 As Ng et al. (1999) remark, before their paper, based on an original survey, the only comprehensive documentation 
for the U.S., though with a focus on sectors rather than on firm level data, goes back to 1970 and is based on the records 
of a primary operator, Dun & Bradstreet, in the management of receivables of medium-large firms in various countries.  
13 As can be easily gauged inspecting Tables 1 and 2, credit periods are far lower than the current effective ones.   7 
points above the EBC marginal refinancing rate. Moreover, if the delay exceeds 30 days, the debtor 
pays an extra penalty equal to 5 per cent of the debt.  
In the U.K., since  November 1
st, 1998, small firms (up to 50 employees) can charge a penalty 
rate on any late paid TD due from larger firms and the public sector; from  November 1
st, 2000 the 
same rules apply also to small firms counterparties. The creditors’ willingness to enforce the new 
rules is as yet however pretty low and experts' expectations are very cautious, because of the direct 
costs involved in making use of the Act and of the indirect ones created by the fear of hindering 
relationships with suppliers and customers (Bank of England, 2000).          
These new legislations will soon be strengthened as a consequence of the EC Directive on late 
payments, published in August 2000, setting a common minimum reference standard national 
legislations of  EU countries have to comply with within two years. The key features of the 
Directive are: a standard 30 days credit period (60 only for some types of contracts) with private 
and public counterparties; a default penalty interest rate at least 7 percentage points above the EBC 
main refinancing operations interest rate
14. The Directive considers also legal instruments able to 
minimize the transaction costs incurred by small firms in order to make use of the new legal 
framework. 
An obvious first step, in order to assess the effective impact of these new rules – supposing they 
are fully enforced - aimed at combating late payments, is an empirical investigation on the current 
TC monetary cost in countries most likely affected, because of much larger credit periods. The MC 
dataset, though with many shortcomings, allows to perform this task using firm-level data, besides 
helping to fill a gap in the TC literature, where as already remarked only Ng et al. (1999) and 
Wilner (2000) have provided for the US a much needed updated evidence on TC practices on 
average data by sectors.  
3.  Trade credit practices in the Italian manufacturing sector  
The 1994 edition of the triennial MC survey on more than 5000 manufacturing firms – a 
representative sample for firms with 11 to 500 employees and all largest ones – includes, besides a 
short time series of annual accounts and information on a set of firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics, 
a questionnaire on credit and debt periods, average ex-post delays, percent of TD paid late, size of 
discounts taken and offered for quicker payments, penalties for late payments, how common are 
these pricing practices; every question refers separately to three counterparties: firms in the same 
group, other non-group Italian and foreign firms. The sample size, even after the shrinking to a 
                                                 
14 Being this rate approximately in the middle of the two percentage points wide corridor having the marginal 
refinancing rate as an upper limit, the minimum penalty interest rate is de facto higher than in the actual Italian law. The   8 
maximum of 1549 firms, due to missing values and accounts data internal inconsistencies 
(Appendix 1),  with an under-representation of smaller firms (as hinted by the high, for Italian 
standards, average employees in the first quintile; Table 4), is comparable with the few available 
studies.  
3.1 Data interpretation 
The potentially most attractive feature of the database is the in-depth questionnaire on TD, 
whereas only two questions deal with TC (for the wording of the main questions see Appendix 1), 
with answers that can be linked to firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics and annual accounts for the 
period 1989-94. However, besides the usual cases of missing answers and of anomalous accounting 
data, the structure of the questionnaire raises some methodological problems when interpreting the 
collected information. 
First, The answers, clustered around some focal points (for instance the average debt period, the 
average delays beyond contractual agreements, discounts offered or extended for quicker payments; 
Table 2), seem to mirror what a respondent thinks to be the "normal" practice in the sector the firm 
belongs to, rather than the own experience. The low data variability is a serious drawback for an 
econometric investigation linking their determinants to firms’ idiosyncratic features. 
Second, the drop rate for answers referred to two counterparties -  firms in the same group, 
foreign ones – is pretty high; moreover, the questionnaire structure does not include a grand total 
answer for each question, a rather serious weakness because it prevents checking for the mutual 
consistency of single items and, as in the case of annual flows for TC and TD, for the compatibility 
with the stock figures in the balance sheet and with the underlying transaction variables (sales and 
purchases) in the income account. 
Third, the questionnaire asks whether a discount offer for payments one month earlier than 
agreed  was made or received; there is not, however, a question on whether the proposal was 
accepted by the counterparty. The wording of the question is also open to different interpretations. 
Literally, the discount refers to any payment made one month earlier than the agreed deadline: in a 
two-part contract, it would be like setting D = N – 30, with N  > D; however, it is very likely that 
the respondent interpretation be of a standard two-part contract with N=αD, with  α=2 or 3, similar 
to the actual practice in the US and in Germany or to the wording in the quoted Dun&Bradstreet 
(2000) study. The implied interest rate in foregoing the discount for quicker payment would of 
course be very different in the two cases, the lower the larger the N - D period; moreover, 
respondents’ answers could refer to effective – i.e. including ex-post delays – rather than agreed 
upon N, the more so if penalties for late payments are not enforced. Indeed, an upper bound to the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reference interest rate, revised at the beginning of each semester, is the marginal or EBC set interest rate for the last   9 
implied interest rate could be found in the penalty imposed for each month of delay beyond the 
agreed date: unfortunately, there is a dramatic drop in the percentage of answers to this question.  
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the answers to the questionnaire provide a unique snapshot 
of the practices on TC and TD among Italian manufacturing firms. The data refer to a not so recent 
year, 1994, but the 1999 evidence on debt periods, contractual and effective (Table 1), suggests that 
in the meantime very little has changed. 
3.2 An exploratory data analysis  
This subsection provides the results of a descriptive data analysis of the MC survey.  
-  The average debt period vis-à-vis Italian independent suppliers is longer than for foreign 
ones, though with a high dispersion across firms; the difference, both on average and median data, 
does not show up in the 25
th or in 75
th quantile (Table 2). The difference widens with the asset size, 
more noticeably in the case of Italian suppliers; the phenomenon shows up only comparing the 
lower fifth with the remaining firms, when sales are used as a dimensional indicator. The average 
contractual credit period with Italian counterparties, the likely expression of the “normal” practice 
in each sector,  rather than of the own experience, is of about three times the normal length (one 
month) according to the EC Directive.  
-  The proportion of suppliers offering discounts is low on average (slightly above 8 per cent 
for Italian ones and almost 5 for foreigners). Moreover, the option is acknowledged to be available 
to a limited subset of firms: the median value is in fact zero for Italian suppliers, going to 5 per cent 
only in the 75
th quantile; this statistic is zero for foreign suppliers. 
-  The annual interest rate implied by the discount offered for quicker payments is on average 
(using the 2.9 per cent discount for Italian suppliers) above 40 per cent, very much like the U.S. 
experience with a the two-part contract, (Ng et al., 1999), if the interpretation of a fixed N-D = 30 of 
the wording of the question is accepted; the rate of interest would drop instead to 19.3 per cent,  for 
an agreed period of 90 days, accepting the second interpretation with a variable N-D
15. It is useful to 
notice that the average short term bank lending rate in 1994 was 11.2 per cent, a figure bounding 
from below the average rate for uncollateralized very short term loans, i.e. the closest substitute to 
TD
16. Some other pieces of information that can be drawn from the questionnaire - spread and size 
of penalties for late payments and of discount offers, a comparison between rationed and non-
                                                                                                                                                                  
main refinancing operation before the beginning of the solar semester. 
15 On 1999 data, the implied rate, with d = 1.95%, D = 15 -  a clause similar to the German one and according to Dun & 
Bradstreet (2000) applied in the 2.5 % of  Italian large firms  -  is equal to 9.9 for N = 90.    
16 It may be useful to remember that the closest approximation to the ECB marginal refinancing for the Bank of Italy, 
namely the discount rate plus a policy determined spread (tasso per le anticipazioni fisse), was in 1994 around  8.5 per 
cent. A counterfactual application of the 1998 Italian legislation would imply a penalizing rate for late payments  equal 
to 13.5 per cent, quite similar to the effective average short term lending rate.    10 
rationed firms in the loan market – may help to shed some light on which interpretation is more 
plausible.  
-  Penalties for late payments are applied pretty rarely (slightly over 4 per cent from Italian 
suppliers and almost zero from foreign ones). Even though the reduced number of answers suggests 
caution, a non-null proportion at most in the upper fourth of respondents is a striking result;   
surprising is also the low incidence of acknowledged late payments, when compared with the 
measured (on accounting data) debt periods. The positive correlation between the proportion of late 
payments and total assets does not show up when firms are ordered by sales: this latter finding is 
also noticed in the 1999 Dun & Bradstreet (2000) survey and is rationalized with the argument that 
shorter delays of Italian larger firms arise because of the longer contractual credit periods they are 
able to obtain
17. On average, the proportion of late payments vis-à-vis foreign suppliers is a half 
compared to Italian ones. 
- With  the  caveat of few answers, penalties are imposed only after considerable delays in 
payments (one to two months). The question on the size of the penalty, if it is ever imposed by 
Italian suppliers per month of delay,  receives even fewer answers (62; just 7 for the foreign 
suppliers): the median/third quantile
18 values for Italian suppliers imply an annual interest rate of 
approximately 20/27 per cent, signit is icantly lower than the interest rate due to the proposed 
discount according to the first interpretation. 
-  At least a half of firms state that they do not offer discounts for quicker payments. The 
implied interest rate is on average even lower than for TD, going from 15.6 to 7.5 for a stated credit 
period of 90 days, according to the first or the second interpretation of the wording of the question. 
The first finding is somehow puzzling, when compared to the Ng et al. (1999) result, for the U.S., of 
a much lower proportion - only a quarter of firms, manufacturing and not - than in Italy offering a 
two-part TC contract. The second finding raises some doubts about the plausibility of a high TD 
effective cost: from the answers of a much larger number of firms than for the corresponding 
question on TD (1087 vs 338), and under the assumption that discounts offered/received from/by 
Italian firms be roughly the two sides of a coin, the implied interest rate is, even accepting the 
interpretation of a fixed N-D=30 days, far nearer to the lower bound computed for TD accepting the 
second, of a variable N-D,  interpretation. 
-  Do these outcomes raise doubts on the overall coherency of the respondents’ answers? It 
does not seem to be the case: as an informal check, regressing the percentage of debt paid later on 
                                                 
17 Considering the effective credit periods of the 50 largest Italian firms, 42% settles after more than 90 days, compared 
to only 23% for all Italian firms surveyed (Dun & Bradstreet, 2000). 
18 The average value of 2.6 per cent is heavily influenced by some outliers, as can be easily gauged from the much 
lower median and 3
rd quantile values (1.5 and 2 per cent).    11 
the discount offer received, controlling for firms’ characteristics – Pavitt macrosector, macroregion, 
ROA – the result is a negative and significant (t = 2.9) coefficient, implying that an extra point in 
discount  on a monthly basis is associated with a decrease of late payments by 1.7 percentage 
points. 
-  The logical link, emphasized in Petersen-Rajan (1994), between smaller firms rationed in 
the bank credit market and recourse to the more expensive TC extended by larger firms
19 is, in the 
Italian case, implausible on a priori grounds, at least before the new legislations become effective; 
this claim has support in the information gathered from the MC dataset.  
Firms are asked two questions, in order to ascertain whether they are credit rationed: first, have 
they applied for larger loans than in fact obtained; second, would they have accepted to pay more 
(for the exact wording, see Appendix 1)? Under the usual caveat for the few firms acknowledging 
to be rationed (6 per cent), a rather large set of indicators - answers to the TC section of the 
questionnaire and economic and financial indicators (on accounting data) – suggests, at most, a 
weak link (Table 3)
 20. The answers for the average debt period, the discount offer received, the 
ratio to debt paid after the scheduled date, the average delay and the penalty applied by suppliers are 
the same on median data; on average data  they are higher for rationed firms, with the remarkable 
exception of the discount offer received. Even less different are the statistics computed from 
accounting data – credit and debt periods, ROA, implicit borrowing cost, sales growth rate – , with 
the exceptions of two financial indicators – TD as a ratio to bank loans and leverage – much higher 
for rationed firms.  
Table 4 summarizes, keeping the same firms' ordering of Table 2, some economic and financial 
indicators computed from accounting data, that allow for comparability with most other studies and 
at the same time for a better interpretation of the answers to the TC questionnaire. Some aspects 
deserve comments. 
a. The average number of employees in the 25
th quantile - 33 - signals the low incidence of 
small and micro firms in the sample. This is a serious warning on how well the sample is 
representative of the manufacturing sector: in 1996, the average labor force (employees and self-
employed) per firm was 8.9, lower than the 9.5 figure in 1991. 1994 was a year of recovery, as 
witnessed by the high growth rates of nominal (and real) sales, though with an uneven distribution 
                                                 
19 Note however that according to Ng et al. (1999, Table III), the answers distribution of respondents offering two-part 
contracts, when asked whether taking TC suggests that the customer cannot obtain financing elsewhere is the following: 
never (49,4%), occasionally (40.3), half of the time (3.4), frequently (5.6), always (1.3).    
20 The set of indicators is computed for a subset of non-rationed firms with a number of employees in 1994 at most 
equal to the largest rationed firm, in order not to bias the comparison including larger firms unlikely to be rationed. The 
results (available on request) do not change however when including all larger firms.     12 
across size: inspecting the quintiles by sales, it is easy to spot a positive correlation between levels 
and growth rates. 
b. The credit and debt periods, measured on accounting data, are on average longer than 4 
months; for one fourth of the sample they are longer than 5. A comparison with the average period 
answer, under the joint hypothesis of an infra-annual and within size cell uniform distribution of 
underlying transactions,  suggests that ex post payment delays are systematic and at least longer 
than 30 days, as acknowledged independently by the few firms answering this question (see Table 
2). Examining more closely the cell values, the credit period is on average similar for the first 80
th 
quantile (by sales)  of firms, falling in the largest fifth; a positive correlation can be detected instead 
ordering firms by total assets. The debt period (median values), slightly positively correlated with 
total assets, shows a clear negative correlation with sales.   
c.  The ratio of TD to short term bank loans is on average approximately one, with a widely 
scattered distribution, as shown by a median value of 0.7; the highest values show up in the 20
th and 
in the 80
th quantiles. This is an additional finding that does not fit the argument put forward in 
Petersen-Rajan (1994) – TD is an expensive financing instrument used by (small) firms more likely 
to be credit rationed – because larger firms, with a superior financial expertise, should be able to 
correctly rank by cost the two financing instruments.  
4. Econometric investigation 
The previous Section has provided plenty of univariate statistics; in order to explore in a   
multivariate setting the determinants of credit and debt periods, however, the many shortcomings of 
the questionnaire and of the patterns of answers suggest to adopt in the econometric investigation as 
dependent variables the ratios to the underlying transaction variables (annual sales and purchases, 
respectively) of end-of-year TC and TD figures.  Besides an easier comparison with most studies, 
other motivations for this choice are that it allows us to consider the relationships with all suppliers 
and buyers, an obvious requirement inhibited by the missing grand total in the questionnaire 
structure, and to include also payment delays beyond agreed dates. The choice does not imply 
discarding the evidence provided by firms’ answers, because it has a key role in the econometric 
investigation in providing: 1. compelling evidence on the basic assumption, shaping the 
interpretation of the results, that in the Italian case TC is not sizably more expensive than bank 
lending and actually can be even cheaper; 2. a directly measured offered discount as a determinant 
for TC; 3. clues to suitably define subsets of answering firms to check for the robustness of the 
estimates and to explore firms’ heterogeneous responses to financial determinants. 
As it is well-known, accounting data on interfirm credit, with no matching with the 
counterparties, do not one to disentangle demand and supply motivations: explanatory equations are   13 
bound to be reduced forms
21; in addition, whereas for TD the funding role is overwhelming – and 
consequently financial determinants more relevant - , TC is a sales promoting instrument (see 
Schwartz-Withcomb, 1979; Brennan et al., 1988) as well as a financing one.  
In order to try to disentangle own policy effects from counterparties’ decisions using accounting 
data for TC taken and granted the econometric exercise relies on two basic assumptions. First, a 
firm has a greater leverage on TC, because it depends first of all on the sales promotion policy and, 
to a lesser extent, on the financial strategies chosen; TD, instead, is basically the result of suppliers’ 
– sales promotion and financial – choices, with a reduced role for indicators of a firm’s current 
performance, based on inside information and only later known by other operators
22, to modify – 
usually upwards - the debt period beyond the agreed date. A battery of robustness checks can be 
devised exploiting the opportunities of suitably splitting the sample thanks to the answers to the 
questionnaire. For example, firms acknowledging they adopt as sellers a discount policy can be 
taken to be comparatively more financially expert and hence to be more reactive to return 
considerations  in their TD policy. Second, as a key for interpreting the results of the estimates, in 
contrast with the US and the German experiences, the cost differential of TD compared to bank 
lending, because of the scarcity of two-part contracts, of the length of credit periods and of penalties 
for late payments, is low. The few answers on the size of discount offers received and of the 
penalties for late payments (see Table 2) however do not allow one to build a reliable 
comprehensive indicator of the TD own monetary cost: it is therefore implicitly included in the 
constant in the estimated equations, that include instead the other element of the cost differential – 
bank lending rate, proxied by the implied external borrowing rate
23 . The TC explanatory equations, 
instead, include the discount offered to Italian independent counterparties, given the sufficiently 
high number of answering firms (see Table 2). 
To sum up, the suggested reduced form equation for the credit period (computed a ratio to sale of 
end-year TC, cre) is: 
                                                 
21 A way out suggested in the influential Petersen-Rajan (1997) study is, at least for TD, to estimate a sort of notional 
“normal trade debt” demand equation, exploiting the information in their data-set on the percentage of purchases bought 
on invoice, and then using the predicted values as a determinant, together with various financial indicators, of the actual 
trade debt stock figures. The same methodological problem encountered in the MC survey, namely that such an 
information could refer to normal practices in the sector rather than to the answering firm’s own experience, could 
however cause a flawed indicator. In the MC database, anyway, a percentage of purchases bought on invoice would be 
uninformative, because of the tripartite split of counterparties without a grand total; moreover,  relatively to Italian 
independent counterparties, the percentage is close or equal to one hundred.      
22 In the Italian case most firms, unlisted, provide only annual income and balance sheet accounts some months after the 
end of the year.   
23 The approximation is acceptable in the 1994 Italian case because debt financing is almost exclusively bank lending, 
mostly short term.    14 
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where the explanatory variables can be grouped into four categories. 
1.  Financial determinants: implied cost of external borrowing, r;  discount firms 
acknowledge they offer for payments 30 days earlier than the agreed date, disc; a current 
profitability index, such as ROA
24. The expected signs for r and disc are negative: in the first case, 
because of the opportunity cost of borrowing short term from banks in order to extend payment 
delays; in the second case, because a higher discount should incentive debtors to pay quicker. Note 
that entering directly disc implies to leave open the question on which interpretation to accept on 
the implied opportunity cost of foregoing a discount; as a consequence, it is not allowed to compare 
directly the estimated coefficients of disc and of an annual interest rate, such as r. The negative sign 
attached to ROA is motivated by the basic assumption that extending trade credit is, on purely 
financial grounds, a dominated investment choice, which can then be pursued, ceteris paribus, by 
less profitable firms gambling for better performances through higher sales. 
2.  Sales promoting determinants: gross profit as a ratio to sales, marg; sales growth rate, g. 
The sales promoting role of TC can be caught under two dimensions: first, a structural implicit price 
discrimination policy (Schwartz-Whitcomb, 1979) can be better realized when (as suggested by 
Petersen-Rajan, 1997) a seller has a high margin to sales, generating the required resources and 
providing incentives for sales (hence positive sign for marg); second, as an anticyclical instrument 
to stabilize sales (negative sign for g). Empirically, in order to pick a structural feature of the firm 
policy marg is averaged over two years; in order to avoid simultaneity between cre and g, because 
of the annual frequency of data, g is lagged one year. 
3.  Transaction technology: location by 4 macroregions (dummy variables REG); sector by 
4 Pavitt macrosectors (dummy variables SETT); buyers’ typology (type), by marketing channels and 
type of production
25. Shorter credit periods abroad (see Table 1) suggest an expected negative sign 
for the export to sales ratio, exp. 
4.  Idiosyncratic characteristics: being a member of a group, should enhance, ceteris 
paribus, a firm’s credit standing and hence lower the opportunity cost of extending TC (positive 
sign for the dummy variable group). It must be remembered, however, that the data do not allow, 
                                                 
24 A better indicator of profitability, such as ROE, was discarded because of data problems in the income accounts for a 
large number of firms.    
25 Though firms provide in the MC database the proportion of sales for each category, the resulting regressors are 
similar to binary dummies, because of the low number of firms reporting positive values. More precisely, of the 1115 
firms providing valid answers in the questionnaire, zero values are found at least up to the eighth, the seventh and the   15 
for a sufficiently large number of firms, to measure the infragroup component of TC, with the 
obvious consequences of possible distortions caused by policies aiming at a localization of profits in 
order to minimize the overall tax burden.  
The simpler suggested reduced form equation for the debt period (computed as a ratio of end-
year to annual purchases, deb) takes into account, besides the transaction technology, three 
categories of determinants: opportunity cost, r, with expected positive sign; distress indicators, such 
as current profitabily, proxied by ROA, and sales growth rate, g, are expected to be negatively 
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The expected signs for the distress indicators are justified on the grounds that a less profitable 
firm with poor sales is likely to exploit the opportunity of postponing payment schedules to junior 
creditors (as is the case in Italy for suppliers compared to employees and banks)
26. The expected 
sign of unitprch is a priori uncertain: a firm with more dependent suppliers could enjoy a 
monopsonistic power in setting longer debt periods; the same indicator, however, could instead 
proxy suppliers’ greater contractual leverage, with an opposite effect on deb.  
The following subsections present the results of the econometric exercise.    
        
4.1 Trade credit 
A basic linear specification for (1) is the following:  
ε δ
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In the econometric exercise it was chosen to distinguish between negative and positive g, in 
order to pick possible asymmetric effects; preliminary regressions showed that the macroregion 
dummies  REG were poorly significant
27 as well as two types of marketing channels and 
consequently these regressors were excluded. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
sixth decile for the proportion of sales to the public sector, to detailers and to wholesalers or out of subcontracting, 
respectively (see also Table 9).  
26 Of course, it could be argued that the same sign could be motivated assuming that suppliers, in order to keep a 
customer, would be willing to let the debtor to stretch payment terms in order to help weathering temporary  difficulties.  
27 The joint F-test of exclusion for the basic specification in column (1), Table 5, was F(3,704)=0.6.    16 
The OLS estimates lend overall support to the a priori predictions (Table 5)
28. Starting with the 
basic specification estimates at column (1), let us consider first the transaction technology: the 
influence of customary nationwide practices across sectors is signaled by the strong rejection of the 
joint zero restrictions on the SETT dummies; also rejected is the joint zero restriction for the type 
regressors
29. Also exp is strongly significant: an additional percentage point implies a lower cre by 
more than one tenth of point. Sizable (almost 3 percentage points) is the positive effect on cre of the 
group dummy. 
The sales promoting role for cre is buttressed under both dimensions: the statistical significance 
of only the non positive lagged g is easily rationalized on the grounds of stabilizing sales around the 
levels already attained: indeed, firms do not react to rising sales. An additional percentage point for 
marg translates into a cre higher by one sixth. 
Examining finally the financial determinants, both r and ROA coefficients are negative and 
highly significant: an additional percentage point  implies, respectively, a lower cre by 12 and 45 
per cent. The more interesting feature is however the negative sign and the significance for the 
novel explanatory variable disc. It is true that this result must be considered with some caution, 
because the relatively large practice of discount offers, suggested from the answers to the 
questionnaire, looks hardly compatible with the low proportion of firms in the same sample 
acknowledging to receive discount offers
30.  
A first attempt at clarifying the role of disc is provided in columns (2) and (3), reporting 
estimates for firms who state they do(do not) offer discounts to Italian independent parties for 
quicker payments, a distinction that could help identifying more(less) financially expert firms. 
Interestingly, besides providing an overall robustness check for the estimated basic specification on 
samples reduced by roughly a half, a comparison of columns (1) and (2)  shows that the r and disc 
coefficients rise in absolute value by at least a third, whereas the other coefficients are much more 
stable, except for the group dummy; comparing columns (2) and (3), instead, the reactivity to 
financial determinants – to r in the first place -  is much lower for the second subset of firms. It is 
worth noticing that comparing columns (2) and (3) the coefficient (not reported in the Table) for the 
variable representing the incidence of sales to public sector counterparties, less likely to be 
                                                 
28 Besides the usual statistic of explained variability (adjusted R
2), the DW statistic is also reported, as a generic 
misspecification indicator. 
29 The pattern of the coefficient signs (estimates not reported here, available on request) is easily interpretable: the 
typology of sales markets reduces the credit period the higher the proportion of sales through own distributive channels 
to detailers or to wholesalers and the lower acting as a subcontractor or, in particular, for coefficient size and statistical 
significance, as a counterparty to the public sector.     
30 Note, however, that a qualitatively similar remark applies also in the US case, though considering two different 
samples. According to Ng et al. (1999), around a quarter of manufacturing firms offer discounts; in Petersen-Rajan 
(1997) about three quarters of small and medium-sized firms report to have received discount offers.   17 
responsive to discount offers, though always positive, is lower in size and statistical significance 
(0.11 with a t = 1.3 vs 0.37 with  a t = 5.4).  
Column (4) reports the estimates for the basic specification augmented for the deb regressor. In 
spite of the risks of reverse causation (see e.g. Petersen-Rajan, 1997, fn 16) in the intuitive 
argument that the capability to extend the credit period is positively correlated with the length of 
payment delays obtained, it is interesting to note that  the additional regressor enters with the 
expected sign, has a sizably effect (an additional percentage point implies an increase of cre by 
more than a fourth of point) and, though highly significant, does not alter the main results reported 
in column (1).  
4.2 Trade debt 
 A basic specification for (2) is the following: 
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where, as before for cre, in order to pick possible asymmetric effects, the sales growth rate is 
entered separately for positive and negative values.  The OLS estimates of the basic specification 
with a sample of almost 1100 firms fit overall the a priori predictions, with many highly significant 
regressors (Table 6, column (1)).  The variables proxying the transaction technology – additive 
dummies for Pavitt macrosectors and share of sales by type of production and of marketing 
channels – are the same as in the cre equation. Also for deb  the additive dummies for macroregions 
are jointly poorly significant (F(3, 1093)=1.5) and consequently dropped from the basic 
specification estimated. Another analogy is that the more relevant among the type regressors is the 
share of sales to public sector counterparties (an additional percentage point is associated with a 
higher deb by a sixth of a point), a result easily motivated if a firm transfers to its own suppliers the 
very large effective debt periods of these customers (see Marotta, 1995)
 31.  
The negatively signed unitprch suggests that the bargaining power of (large) suppliers more than 
offsets the monopsonistic leverage of their contracting party. r enters positively signed and with a 
non negligible effect: one additional percentage point translates into a 0.11 per cent higher deb. 
The negatively signed current ROA and non positive g, whereas the positive g coefficient is 
comparatively small and insignificant, supporting the interpretation as distress indicators: firms 
finding themselves underperforming choose to delay the settlements of their obligations with junior 
creditors, such as suppliers. The quantitative effects are quite sizable: one additional percentage 
                                                 
31 The pattern of the other type coefficient estimates (not reported here, available on request) is easily interpretable: the 
debt period increases the higher the proportion of sales to non commercial firms or acting as a subcontractor, again 
because delays in payments received could be translated into own delays, and decreases the higher the proportion 
through own distributive channels to wholesalers.       18 
point in ROA and (in absolute levels) non positive g are associated with a lower deb by 0.31 and 
0.18 per cent, respectively.   
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 report the estimates on two subsets of firms, chosen with the 
same criterion as in Table 5, namely according to the answer on whether they grant a discount to 
buyers (only Italian, not belonging to the same group, in order to get enough valid answers
32) for 
quicker payments. The underlying rationale is that an active credit management is a clue to a firm is 
greater financial ability and, hence, to a greater reactivity to financial determinants. Comparing the 
estimates for r and ROA of columns (2) and (3), the former indeed show coefficients with larger 
absolute values and higher statistical significance; the r coefficient in column (3) is even not 
significant. A puzzling result, for the distress interpretation is, however, that the positive g 
coefficient in column (3), though in absolute terms lower by a half compared to the non positive 
one, is positive and highly significant. 
Column (4) is symmetric to the same column in Table 5, adding to the basic specification the 
regressor cre: as before, the insertion of a highly significant regressor shows the robustness of the 
estimates in column (1).   
4.3 A closer look at the dimensional effect 
In order to examine more closely the link between TC and firms’ size, a recurring theme in the 
literature as previously remarked, column (5) in Tables 5-6 shows the estimated basic specification 
(column 1) augmented with four (additive) dummies, one for each of the first four quintiles (defined 
over the 1549 firms in the sample)  by total assets. It turns out that, besides a further support for the 
robustness of the estimates in column 1, except for the group dummy, which becomes insignificant,  
dimension matters, because the joint zero restriction on the new dummies is soundly rejected; after 
having controlled for the other determinants, a negative correlation is evident between size and cre 
– ceteris paribus, firms in the extreme quintiles differ by almost 8 points in cre - ; the relation does 
not show instead any definite pattern for deb.  
These results on the link between firm dimension and credit and debt periods are not robust, 
however, to the choice of a criterion for size. Considering the quintiles by sales levels, in fact, the 
joint zero restrictions on the dummies are easily accepted for cre (Table 5, column (6)); for deb, 
instead, they are rejected at a highly significant level, as before, but coefficients show a negative 
correlation pattern with size (Table 6, column (6)).     
Using additive dummies could, however, fail to fully account for the effects of a different 
dimension in determining firms’ reactivity to TC and TD determinants. For this reason, Table 7 
reports the estimates of the basic specification for cre splitting the sample between firms with total 
                                                 
32 Out of the 1087 valid answers, almost a half have a value of zero.   19 
assets in the lower two quintiles (column 1) and in the upper three quintiles (column 2) by asset 
size; similarly, Table 8 reports the estimates of the basic specification for deb splitting the sample 
between firms with sales in the lower three quintiles (column 1) and in the upper two quintiles 
(column 2). The splitting criterion chosen is a P-value of at most 5 per cent for the dummies, jointly 
significant and showing a clear pattern related to size (Table 5, column (5); Table 6, column (6)). 
Table 7 suggests some interesting differences between larger and smaller firms in explaining cre. 
Overall, the estimates for the basic specification in Table 5 are replicated only for the subset of 
larger firms. More specifically, the coefficients for r, disc and g are poorly significant for the 
smaller ones (see column 1); for the larger firms, instead, with a likely superior financial expertise,  
they are even larger in absolute terms and highly significant (see column 2).  An interpretation for 
the poor performance of the disc regressor in column 1 could be that buyers do not take seriously 
the two-part contract offered, because a smaller firm cannot credibly enforce it. Also the objective 
of sales stabilization turns out to be more relevant for larger firms; a counterintuitive finding is 
instead the poor performance for marg, which instead is highly significant for the smaller ones. A 
possible interpretation is that the pricing policy of larger firms, less financially constrained, is 
targeted prevalently at objective of smoothing their cycle
33, being the benefit of price discrimination 
presumably reduced by the transaction costs of dealing with many small customers.   
On the whole, these results fit the first basic assumption of this paper, namely that even in 
reduced form equations, in explaining TC the supply determinants can be better caught for firms, 
like the larger ones, better able to implement their own policies; it is instead more difficult to 
disentangle own supply and counterparties’ demand decisions for smaller firms.  
Table 8 roughly replicates these main findings also for deb,  though less sharply because, 
presumably, of the less definite size criterion – assets versus sales - for splitting the sample.  
First of all, the fit of the basic specification for smaller firms is a half compared to larger ones. 
This finding is a further hint that the explanatory power of a firm’s economic indicators is poor in 
reduced form specifications where the counterparties’ supply policies predominate, as it is the case 
for smaller compared to larger firms.  Second, only larger firms are affected significantly by r and  
translate comparatively more into a longer debt period current negative developments of sales. The 
stronger effect of current profitability in lengthening the debt period for smaller firms can be taken 
as a demand side distress effect. A puzzling result is instead the higher dependence from suppliers 
for larger compared to smaller firms. 
                                                 
33 Of course, the credit period lengthening is partly imputable, rather than to own choices, to the mechanical worsening 
of contracting parties’ conditions.   20 
4.4 Some tentative policy implications 
The econometric exercise provides a reasonably sound basis for some tentative answers to the 
question of how sharper policies aimed at combating late payments will affect firms and their 
financing patterns, especially in EU Mediterranean countries characterized, like Italy, by long credit 
periods. First, the cost of  bank lending has a stronger impact on recorded credit and debt periods 
for larger firms, able also to use the TC instrument to smooth their cycle presumably because less 
financially constrained; smaller firms seem to adapt more passively to counterparties’ supply and 
demand TC policies. Second, firms offering discounts for quicker payments are able to reduce their 
credit period; these same firms show also a greater impact of the bank lending cost on their 
recorded credit and debt periods. Third, firms with higher export show a sizable shorter credit 
period. 
On the grounds of this evidence, at least for Italy, mandatory shorter credit periods and default 
penalty rates for late payments, as set as a minimum reference standard in the EC Directive the EU 
countries have to comply with by August 2002, are bound to sharpen the divide between larger and 
smaller firms. Larger firms, facing higher TD opportunity costs, will have to rely, for short-term 
financing, more on banks – as already happens in Germany - and on short-term market instruments, 
such as the commercial paper. Smaller firms, more likely to be enforced rather than enforce the new 
rules, will face costs of adjusting to a better financial expertise, in order to manage likely 
mismatches in the length of credit and debt periods and higher opportunity costs of missing 
deadline payments. Finally, an additional spillover effect is likely to be generated by the reduction 
of the admitted credit periods in the other EU countries: a higher economic integration across the 
EU is bound to raise the rate of enforcement of the new rules towards a German-like pattern in 
interfirm credit. The adjustment to the new payment practices could prove too costly for many small 
firms, especially in Mediterranean countries; there is scope here for a role of local banks acting as 
financial consultants able to introduce small businesses to better financial practices, thus 
strengthening bank-firm customer relationships; a further implication of the latter development 
could be a shift from triangular lending – a bank providing funds to a firm extending TC to a buyer 
– to direct lending to the buyer, with a much improved ability to assess credit risk.  
Besides the two key features of shorter normal credit periods and of a penalty rate for late 
payments, a third important aspect of the EC Directive, at least for Italy, is the extension of the new 
rules to any counterparty, be private or public. Given the very long credit periods currently obtained 
by the public sector, smaller suppliers should the ones to benefit more of quicker payments.   
On the whole, complying with the EC directive is likely to change interfirm credit and firms’ 
relationships with banks and financial markets in the EU Mediterranean countries towards the   21 
German model; in order to ease the transition, however, a better efficiency of institutional 
arrangements in protecting creditors’ claims in case of late payments is called for.  
5. Concluding comments 
A first contribution of this study is to provide detailed information on the cost of interfirm credit 
in the Italian manufacturing sector, exploiting a questionnaire included in the 1994 edition of the 
triennial MC survey
34. The empirical evidence supports the argument that the Italian case is 
different from the one usually considered as “normal” in the US and in the German experiences, 
with a cost hierarchy between commercial credit and cheaper bank credit. The main justifications 
are the low percentage of suppliers offering discounts for quicker payments, the agreed long credit 
periods, the low incidence of penalties for late payments, mostly because of a legal-institutional 
environment that does not effectively protect creditors’ rights. Further evidence against a cost 
hierarchy can be inferred comparing a set of indicators computed separately for “rationed” firms 
acknowledging to have been denied bank loans. 
A puzzling, though not uncommon,  result is the relatively large percentage (about a half) of 
firms acknowledging they offer discounts for quicker payments and, at the same time, the very low 
percentage (less than one tenth) of firms declaring they receive discount offers from their suppliers. 
It is true, though, even in this case, that combining the effective credit periods (agreed plus delays) 
and the size of offered discounts, the estimated interest rate differential between commercial and 
bank credit is by far lower than in the US and German experiences. 
A second  contribution is a cross-section econometric analysis on a large set of Italian firms. 
Some findings are worth commenting. First, the cost of  bank lending has a stronger impact on 
recorded credit and debt periods for larger firms, able also to use the TC instrument to smooth their 
cycle, presumably because less financially constrained; smaller firms seem to adapt more passively 
to counterparties’ supply and demand TC policies. Second, firms offering discounts for quicker 
payments are able to reduce their credit period; these same firms show also a greater impact of the 
bank lending cost on their recorded credit and debt periods. Third, firms with higher export show a 
sizable shorter credit period. Fourth, regressions consistently show heterogeneity in credit and debt 
periods by macrosectors and by marketing channels and production typology, not by location. 
The tentative implications of these results on how the EC directive aimed at combating late 
payments will affect interfirm credit and relationships between firms and banks in Italy and in other 
                                                 
34 It is worth stressing the “local” information provided by the paper. International comparisons  of TC studies are 
severely hindered because of the impact of highly country-specific legal and institutional contexts and of the sectors 
firms belong to. More specifically on this last issue, US (Elliehausen-Wolken, 1993; Petersen-Rajan, 1997) and French 
(Dietsch-Krémp, 1998) studies include, besides manufacturing, as in the panel data Italian (Marotta, 1997) and Spanish   22 
EU Mediterranean countries, towards a German- and US-like model with a definite cost hierarchy 
between TC and cheaper bank lending. An objective for future research is to simulate, at least for 
Italy, the effects of the new TC rules on firms’ accounts suitably using the information provided by 
the MC survey in order to realize the exercise at a high disaggregation level.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
(Hernandez de Cos-Hernando, 1998) studies, also construction and service industries, among which large retailers, with 
sizable monopsonistic power in product markets and ample recourse to credit to final consumers.   23 
Appendix 1. The data 
Trade debt and credit questionnaire 
1.  What is the average period for commercial debt in 1994? 
2.  How many suppliers (per cent) that offered in 1994 payment delays proposed also a discount 
for quicker payments? 
3.  What is the average monthly discount for quicker payments, i.e. the percent price reduction 
a firm can obtain on average anticipating the payment by one month (e.g. cash instead of paying 
thirty days later)? 
4.  In 1994, what percentage of trade debt was paid by the firm beyond the agreed date and 
what was the average extra delay? 
5.  During 1994, what percentage of commercial debt, paid beyond the agreed date, implied a 
penalty? 
6.  What is the average penalty imposed by suppliers, as a percentage of price, for each month 
of delay? 
7.  What is the average monthly discount for quicker payments, i.e. the per cent price reduction 
the firm offers to its buyers if they pay one month earlier than agreed (e.g. cash instead of paying 
thirty days later)? 
All the above questions have to be answered distinguishing between three counterparties: firms 
belonging to the group, other Italian firms, other foreign firms.  
 
Rationing in the bank credit market questionnaire 
 
1.  In 1994, has the firm applied for, but not obtained, more bank loans? 
2.  In 1994, would the firm have accepted tighter terms (higher interest rates or more collateral) 
in order to obtain more bank loans? 
 
The dataset used  
 
The information processed refers to a subset of 1549 firms out of the original MC survey. Firms 
were selected if the 1994 accounts information were consistent and plausible (e.g. non-negative 
depreciation charges): violating this minimal criterion was considered to cast doubts on any other 
information collected on the firm. For each item of the questionnaire, 1549 is the upper limit for the 
valid answers. The following variables (mostly indicators computed on annual accounting data) 
took implausible values and were accordingly recoded to the 99° percentile:  implied borrowing   24 
cost, 1993 and 1994 positive sales growth rates, 1993 negative sales growth rate, ratio to sales of 
trade credit, ratio to purchases of trade debt. For details on variables computation see Appendix 2. 
 
Appendix 2: The regressors 
 
Indicators, in percentage points: 
-  ratio of trade credit to sales (cre); 
-  ratio of trade debt to purchases (deb); 
-  implied borrowing cost ( r ), computed as ratio of financial charges to bank lending and bonds 
(average of end-1993 and end-1994 stock data); 
-  growth rate of sales (g); 
-  ROA, computed as gross returns to total assets ratio; 
-  purchases per supplier (unitprch): ratio of total purchases to the average number of suppliers 
(questionnaire information), in logs. 
Direct information from the questionnaire (percentage points): 
-  monthly discount for 30 days earlier than the agreed date payment (disc): see question 7. in 
Appendix 1; 
-  proportion of exported sales (exp); 
-  firm belonging to a group: binary variable; 
-  ratio to total sales (type) of:      
a)  direct sales to retailers (through own commercial organization); 
b)  sales to public sector parties; 
c)  sales to wholesalers; 
d)  sales to other non commercial firms; 
e)  production directly ordered by other firms; 
f) subcontracted  production. 
Other firms' characteristics: 
- Pavitt  sector (SETT): 3 binary variables, assuming values 1/0 if the firm belongs/does not 
belong to the traditional sector, to the scale one, to the specialization one; 
- macroregion  (REG): 3 binary variables, assuming values 1/0 if the firm is/is not in the  North-
West regions, in the North-East regions, in the Central regions.   25 
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   Table 1
Belgium 45-90 17 53
France 60-90 16 58
Germany 30-60 11 79
Italy 60-120 17 62
Netherland 25-40 17 50
Portugal 60-90 n.a. n.a.
Spain 60-90 n.a. n.a.
U.K. 30-60 15 60
Source: Dun & Bradstreet (2000)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































no of firms average median no of firms average median
from questionnaire
average debt period (days) 61 82.7 90 876 80.9 90
discount offer received (%) 24 2.7 3 257 2.9 3
late payments (% of trade debt) 61 8.1 0 875 5.3 0
average delay (days) 19 36.9 30 174 30.3 30
penalty (%) 5 3.7 1.5 40 2.2 1.5
from 1994 accounts
trade credit/sales (%) 61 34.6 34.9 881 33.9 32.7
trade debt/purchases (%) 61 37.5 38.6 881 38.1 35.8
net trade credit/sales (%) 61 8.8 6.7 881 9.0 8.3
trade debt/bank loans  61 1.23 0.9 881 0.9 0.7
leverage  61 2.8 2.0 881 2.3 1.2
implicit borrowing cost (%) 61 18.7 16.2 881 18.2 14.9
ROA (% points) 61 6.6 6.7 881 7.6 6.9
sales growth rate (%) 61 13.0 11.6 881 13.7 12.8
employees (average) 61 75 60 881 72 61
age (log) 61 3 3 881 2.9 3
Source: own calculations from Mediocredito Centrale (1997). See Table 4 and Appendix 2 for indicator
definitions.
1Firms are rationed according to the answer to question 2 on credit rationing (see Appendix
1). Non-rationed firms have at most 230 employees, upper limit for rationed firms.
Indicators for rationed and non-rationed manufacturing firms
1
rationed non-rationedquintiles (assets)
1^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 198
average 103.7 133.3 6.2 1.0 298.6 22.0 8.7 10.0 29.6
median 98.7 122.4 6.2 0.7 124.0 18.2 0.3 10.9 23.0
2^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 215
average 115.3 136.1 6.5 0.9 247.4 19.2 7.3 14.4 48.2
median 111.3 127.6 5.2 0.6 129.3 16.4 6.8 11.7 40.0
3^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 229
average 126.1 135.6 9.9 0.9 193.0 18.0 7.1 15.9 67.8
median 121.3 129.2 8.9 0.7 129.2 15.3 6.8 11.3 60.0
4^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 309 244
average 131.9 141.8 10.2 1.0 196.0 16.6 7.1 14.7 83.6
median 123.5 130.1 9.2 0.7 117.2 13.6 6.4 12.2 75.5
5^ (no of firms) 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 235
average 142.1 134.7 14.7 1.2 176.3 17.3 6.6 12.8 144.8
median 130.0 130.3 11.1 0.8 115.8 13.6 6.2 10.5 123.0
quintiles (sales)
1^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 198
average 124.3 156.4 8.0 1.2 285.6 20.7 6.5 4.8 29.1
median 112.0 137.9 7.3 0.9 139.2 16.6 6.4 5.8 23.0
2^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 224
average 124.3 139.1 9.7 0.9 266.8 19.0 7.5 11.4 52.8
median 120.2 129.3 8.3 0.7 121.9 16.1 6.5 10.6 46.0
3^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 309 226
average 127.8 140.4 10.0 0.9 187.7 17.7 7.3 19.7 66.8
median 121.5 130.4 8.8 0.7 127.6 15.0 7.2 12.0 62.5
4^ (no of firms) 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 235
average 127.0 130.9 10.2 0.9 172.1 17.9 7.2 15.1 87.2
median 119.6 127.9 8.5 0.6 124.4 14.5 6.5 13.0 78.0
5^ (no of firms) 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 238
average 115.7 114.6 9.6 1.0 199.1 17.7 8.2 16.8 138.7
median 110.6 116.3 8.9 0.6 108.2 13.5 7.4 13.8 115.5
total (no of firms) 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1549 1548 1121
average 123.8 136.3 9.5 1.0 222.3 18.6 7.4 13.6 76.9
1^ quartile   81.6 99.5 -1.0 0.3 45.5 11.2 4.1 -1.7 33.0
median 116.3 128.1 8.3 0.7 122.5 15.1 6.8 11.3 60.0






Source: own calculations from Mediocredito Centrale (1997). 
1 Outstanding bank loans and bonds to net worth ratio. 
2 Ratio of financial charges to outstanding 
bank loans and bonds (average of end-1993 and end-1994 data). 
3 Gross operating profits over total assets.
Table 4






















r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.11 -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 -0.09 -0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.61 -1.01 -0.60 -0.53 -0.60
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
ROA  (%) -0.55 -0.62 -0.50 -0.37 -0.51 -0.55
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
marg: average 1993 and 1994 profits to sales ratio (%) 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15
(0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) .. -0.03 0.02 -0.03 .. ..
(0.89) (0.49) (0.65) (0.41) (0.90) (0.90)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
firm belonging to a group (dummy) 2.83 2.15 3.84 3.22 1.73 2.88
(0.02) (0.22) (0.02) (0.01) (0.16) (0.02)
deb: trade debt as a ratio to purchases (%) 0.26
(0.00)
1^ quintile (by size) -7.86 -1.01
(0.00) (0.60)
2^ quintile (by size) -4.75 -0.82
(0.00) (0.60)
3^ quintile (by size) -2.46 1.50
(0.10) (0.32)
4^ quintile (by size) -1.72 0.30
(0.22) (0.83)
no of observations 723 342 381 723 723 723
adjusted R
2  0.24 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.24
DW 1.95 1.73 1.84 1.97 1.95 2.05
Tests on joint zero restrictions
   - Pavitt macrosectors F(3,707)=14.2
   - type
1: a), b), c), f) F(4,707)=9.2
   - size F(4,703)=5.0 F(4,703)=0.7
       (5)               (6)              
(2) and (3): firms offering/non-offering discounts for payments 30 days or less earlier than the agreed date to Italian customers, non 
belonging to their group. (5) and (6): size defined as total assets and sales, respectively.
1See Appendix 2.
Dependent variable: trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales (cre)
OLS; P-value in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and buyers' type regressors are not reported
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)Table 6
r: implied borrowing cost (%) 0.11 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.10
(0.01) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ROA  (%) -0.31 -0.36 -0.27 -0.24 -0.29 -0.31
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
g: non positive sales growth rate  (%) -0.18 -0.15 -0.19 -0.13 -0.20 -0.14
(0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
g: positive sales growth rate  (%) 0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.14) (0.38) (0.01) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19)
unitprch:purchases per supplier (log) -1.83 -2.10 -1.73 -1.71 -2.27 -1.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
cre 0.26
(0.00)
1^ quintile (by size) -3.73 5.79
(0.02) (0.00)
2^ quintile (by size) -0.79 3.91
(0.60) (0.01)
3^ quintile (by size) -0.46 4.50
(0.75) (0.00)
4^ quintile (by size) 2.54 1.97
(0.08) (0.17)
no of observations 1106 475 603 1106 1106 1106
adjusted R
2  0.17 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.18
DW 1.99 1.93 2.09 1.94 1.93 2.06
Tests on joint zero restrictions
   - Pavitt macrosectors F(3,1093)=11.9
   - type
1: b), c), d), e)  F(4,1093)=14.7
   - size dummies  F(4,1089)=4.1 F(4,1089)=3.8
(5) (6)
(2) and (3): firms offering/non-offering discounts for payments 30 days or less earlier than the agreed date to Italian 
customers, non belonging to their group. (5) and (6): size defined as total assets and sales, respectively. 
1See Appendix 2.
Dependent variable: trade debt as a per cent ratio of purchases (deb)
OLS; P-value in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt sectors and regions and buyers' type 
regressors are not reported
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)Table 7
r: implied borrowing cost (%) -0.05 -0.13
(0.52) (0.02)
discount for quicker payments (%) -0.03 -0.73
(0.95) (0.07)
ROA  (%) -0.56 -0.49
(0.00) (0.00)
marg: average 1993 and 1994 profits to sales ratio (%) 0.23 0.08
(0.00) (0.21)
g t-1: non positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.13 -0.26
(0.23) (0.00)
g t-1: positive sales growth rate in 1993 (%) -0.05 -0.04
(0.23) (0.33)
exp: export to sales ratio (%) -0.13 -0.13
(0.00) (0.00)
firm belonging to a group (dummy) 4.17 1.99
(0.15) (0.14)
no of observations 199 524
adjusted R
2  0.27 0.24
DW 2.16 1.97
Regressors (1) (2)
(1): firms included in the lower two quintiles by total asset size; (2) firms included in
the upper three quintiles by total asset size.
Dependent variable: trade credit as a per cent ratio of sales (cre)
Sample split by asset size 
OLS; P-value in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt 
sectors and buyers' type regressors are not reportedTable 8
r: implied borrowing cost (%) 0.08 0.14
(0.23) (0.00)
ROA  (%) -0.36 -0.15
(0.00) (0.13)
g: non positive sales growth rate  (%) -0.14 -0.24
(0.04) (0.01)
g: positive sales growth rate  (%) 0.04 -0.05
(0.37) (0.18)
unitprch:purchases per supplier (log) -0.66 -2.26
(0.32) (0.00)
no of observations 641 465
adjusted R
2  0.12 0.25
DW 1.92 2.08
(1): firms included in the lower three quintiles by sales size; (2) firms included in
the upper two quintiles by sales size.
Dependent variable: trade debt as a per cent ratio of purchases (deb) 
Sample split by sales size
OLS; P-value in brackets; coefficients of constant, additive dummies for Pavitt 
sectors and regions and buyers' type regressors are not reported
Regressors (1) (2)Table 9
no of firms average median 1^ percentile 99^ percentile std. dev.
Regressors
cre (%) 1549 34.00 32.1 0 97.07 17.08
deb (%) 1549 37.60 35.57 5.21 110.26 16.71
r (%) 1549 18.52 15.07 3.77 66.22 11.54
g (%) 1548 12.24 11.25 -49.84 102.12 25.31
g t-1(%) 1302 5.29 2.96 -51.37 104.58 25.58
ROA (%) 1549 7.36 6.75 -18.32 31.01 8.52
marg(%) 1548 21.85 20.67 -24.36 66.69 16.13
unitprch (log) 1109 3.74 3.63 1.23 6.79 1.15
disc (%) 1087 1.25 0 0 5.00 1.69
exp (%) 843 39.68 35.00 0.50 100 29.73
group 1123 0.22 0 0 1 0.41
type (%):
a) 1115 11.87 0 0 100 28.49
b) 1115 3.82 0 0 88.40 14.95
c) 1115 20.87 0 0 100 34.52
d) 1115 41.75 20.00 0 100 45.11
e) 1114 76.27 100 0 100 37.51













Source: own calculations from Mediocredito Centrale (1997). See Appendix 2 for details.
1The sample size in each
regression depends on the availability of admissible values for the set of regressors.